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Abstract
We decompose the beauty premium in an experimental labor market
where ‘employers’ determine wages of ‘workers’ who perform a maze-solving
task. This task requires a true skill which we show to be una ected by phys-
ical attractiveness. We ﬁnd a sizable beauty premium and can identify three
transmission channels. (1) Physically-attractive workers are more conﬁdent
and higher conﬁdence increases wages. (2) For a given level of conﬁdence,
physically-attractive workers are (wrongly) considered more able by employ-
ers. (3) Controlling for worker conﬁdence, physically-attractive workers have
oral skills (such as communication and social skills) that raise their wages
when they interact with employers. Our methodology can be adopted to
study the sources of discriminatory pay di erentials in other settings.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C91, J31
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11 Introduction
In their seminal work, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found that physically-attractive
workers derive sizable rents from their looks. Workers of above average beauty earn
about 10 to 15 percent more than workers of below average beauty. The size of
this beauty premium is economically signiﬁcant and comparable to the race and
gender gaps in the US labor market.
In this paper we decompose the beauty premium that arises during the wage
negotiation process between employer and worker in an experimental labor market.
We let workers perform a task that requires a true skill which is uncorrelated with
physical attractiveness. This allows us to abstract away from the productivity
enhancing e ects of beauty (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Pfann, Bosman, Biddle,
and Hamermesh, 2000). Although these e ects are important in some occupations
with a lot of customer and co-worker interaction they do not seem to explain
the bulk of the overall beauty premium. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) ﬁnd that
accounting for the intensity of job-related interaction has almost no e ect on the
cross-sectional beauty premium.
The participants in our experiment are undergraduate and graduate students
from Tucuman, Argentina who are divided into groups of ‘workers’ and ‘employers’.
Workers are paid to solve as many computer mazes as possible during a 15 minute
employment period. Employers estimate the productivity of workers and set wages
accordingly. We vary the degree of visual and oral interaction between workers and
employers in order to decompose the beauty premium. We also measure workers’
conﬁdence by asking them for an estimate of their future productivity after they
have solved a practice maze.
We can identify three channels through which physical attractiveness raises an
employer’s estimate of a worker’s ability: the conﬁdence channel and the visual and
oral stereotype channels. The conﬁdence channel operates through workers’ beliefs:
we show that physically-attractive workers are substantially more conﬁdent and
worker conﬁdence in return increases wages under oral interaction. The two stereo-
type channels a ect employers’ beliefs: employers (wrongly) expect good-looking
workers to perform better than their less attractive counterparts under both visual
and oral interaction even after controlling for individual worker characteristics and
worker conﬁdence.
The advantage of our experimental approach is that we can open the ‘black
box’ of the wage negotiation process between worker and employer. A large body
of work in social psychology suggests that factors such as conﬁdence and physical
2attractiveness play a big role in labor market outcomes. Beauty is perceived to be
correlated with intelligence, social skills and health (Feingold, 1992; Eagly, Ash-
more, Makhijani, and Longo, 2001).1 According to the kernel of truth hypothesis
the physical attractiveness stereotype can become a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: teach-
ers expect better looking kids to outperform in school and devote more attention
to children who are perceived to have greater potential (Hatﬁeld and Sprecher,
1986). Preferential treatment in return builds conﬁdence as well as social and
communication skills.
Recent research in labor economics has emphasized the importance of non-
cognitive skills such as conﬁdence for labor market success and the role of physical
attributes in acquiring these skills. Evidence from early childhood intervention
programs such as the Perry preschool program demonstrates that these programs
raise lifetime earnings by improving students’ social skills and motivation rather
than through gains in cognitive abilities which are short-lived and dissipate over
time (see Heckman (2000)). The abundant popular self-help literature on ‘pos-
itive thinking’ provides overwhelming anecdotal evidence that people recognize
the income-enhancing e ects of conﬁdence.2 Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman
(2003) analyze the well-known height premium and ﬁnd that teenage height rather
than adult height boosts income: this suggests that height promotes the acquisition
of non-cognitive social skills such as conﬁdence which in turn increase wages.
The use of an experimental framework to decompose the beauty premium is
novel to the best of our knowledge. Notable experimental papers on the e ects
of beauty in non-labor market settings are Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) on the
ultimatum game, Mulford, Orbell, Shatto, and Stockard (1998) and Kahn, Hottes,
and Davis (1971) on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Andreoni and Petrie (2004) on public
goods games and Eckel and Wilson (2004) on trust games.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
theoretical framework to organize our analysis. Section 3 describes the design of
the experiment and our empirical strategy and section 4 discusses our experimental
data. Section 5 shows that beauty has no productivity enhancing e ects for solving
mazes but nevertheless increases the earnings of workers. In section 6 we identify
the various channels through which beauty raises workers’ wages in our experiment.
1Consistent with our ﬁndings, there is no correlation between beauty and cognitive ability
(Feingold, 1992).
2Parents are continuously reminded to use positive reinforcement in interactions with their
children in order to build self-esteem and instill conﬁdence in them. Team sports and group
activities are encouraged not just because students beneﬁt from physical activity but because
they can enhance self-esteem.
3Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The employer has to form an estimate about the productivity A of a worker which
is a function of an observable resume variable x and an unobservable component
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The term  B captures any bias of the worker’s conﬁdence arising from his physical
attractiveness B. We ignore this term for now (  = 0).
Two indicator variables TO and TV describe whether worker and employer can
communicate orally or visually.3 Under oral communication the employer can
observe an unbiased signal ˜ C of the worker’s conﬁdence:
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The employer’s can use this signal to improve her estimate of the worker’s produc-
tivity:
w
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(4)
The employer will put a positive weight on the worker’s signal ˜ C unless the worker
perfectly conceals his private information.4
The employer’s actual estimate ˆ w is subject to two stereotype biases that arise
from a worker’s physical attractiveness B and the his communication and social
skills S which are also a function of beauty:
ˆ w = w
  +  VTV   B +  OTO   S
S = B +  S where  S   N
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3If an interview is conducted only over the telephone we have TO = 1, TV = 0 while in a face
to face conversation TO = 1 and TV = 1.
4Human resource o cers are trained to extract job-relevant information from job interviews.
In our regressions we also include an interaction term between oral communication TV and
conﬁdence to test whether more conﬁdent workers can increase their wages by ‘looking’ more
conﬁdent.
4The coe cient  V captures the visual stereotype channel which is simply the phys-
ical attractiveness stereotype from the social psychology literature. The coe cient
 O denotes the oral stereotype channel - physical attractiveness raises social and
communication skills which in return raise an employer’s estimate of the worker’s
productivity. We assume that the employer is unaware of these biases and hence
does not correct for them.
The worker is subject to similar stereotypes as the employer and we therefore
allow  > 0 in equation 2: beauty increases conﬁdence. If the employer interacts
only orally with the worker her estimate of the worker’s productivity increases by
  B. We refer to this channel as the conﬁdence channel. It is distinct from the
oral stereotype channel because it operates through the worker’s rather than the
employer’s bias.
If the employer interacts orally and visually with the worker and is unaware
that conﬁdence comes, in part, from beauty the same conﬁdence channel applies.
However, if she is aware that beauty boosts conﬁdence, the employer can ﬁlter out
the conﬁdence channel and obtain a better estimate of the worker’s productivity:5
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The actual wage w set by the employer is the sum of the employers’ estimate
ˆ w and a taste-basted discrimination component D which depends positively on a
worker’s physical attractiveness B:
w =ˆ w + D(B) (7)
While we will be looking for evidence of taste-based discrimination, the one shot
nature of our experiment does not provide a fair testing ground to detect direct
taste-based transfers which are more likely to arise in repeated interactions.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Design
Our experimental design allows us to vary the degree of visual and oral interaction
between worker and employer in order to decompose the beauty premium. Each
experimental session includes 5 workers and 5 employers who are randomly assigned
5In subsequent empirical analysis, we do not ﬁnd evidence that ˆ   >  .
5their roles. Employers start with an account of 4000 points while workers have no
points initially.
All participants submit their basic labor market characteristics (age, sex, uni-
versity, matriculation year, previous job experience, extracurricular activities and
hobbies) through an online survey and have their digital photograph taken. Work-
ers are asked to solve a practice maze of the lowest level of di culty and their
practice time is recorded6. The labor market characteristics of a worker together
with his practice time becomes his digital ‘resume’.
Each worker j is then asked for an estimate Cj of how many mazes of the next
level of di culty he expects to complete during a 15 minute ‘employment period’
at the end of the experiment. This information is kept secret from all other players
and provides a measure of worker conﬁdence. The worker receives a piece rate of
100 points per solved maze minus 40 points for each maze that he mispredicted
when estimating Cj:
100   Aj   40  |Cj   Aj| (8)
The misprediction penalty provides the worker with an incentive to truthfully
report the median of his perceived productivity distribution.7 One implication of
our experimental design is that the e ective piece rate of workers is 140 points for
each maze as long as they stay below their estimate and 60 points for each maze
thereafter. Truthful elicitation of workers’ beliefs is bound to somewhat distort
incentives during the employment period. We therefore chose a generous exchange
rate from points to money to ensure that even 60 points represent a salient reward.
Each worker is then matched with 5 di erent employers8. The order in which
workers are matched with employers is randomized to avoid order e ects. All
employers see the same online resume of each worker but they di er in the mode
of interaction with the worker:
B: (baseline) Employer B only sees the resume of the worker.
V: (visual) Employer V sees the resume and a frontal facial passport-like pho-
tograph of the worker.
6The mazes of ﬁve di erent levels of di culty can be found at the Yahoo website
http://games.yahoo.com/games/kidsmz.html. These mazes were ﬁrst used in experimental re-
search by Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003).
7In the instructions, participants are told that at the median they are equally likely to be above
their estimate as they are to fall below the estimate. We did not use a quadratic punishment
scheme to reveal the expected mean of the perceived distribution because we wanted to limit the
size of the maximum penalty and also keep the game as transparent as possible.
8In a session, each worker is matched with every employer and each employer reviews all 5
workers. This allows us to use ﬁxed e ects estimation.
6O: (oral) Employer O sees the resume and conducts a free-form telephone inter-
view with the worker of up to 5 minutes in length.
VO: (visual + oral) Employer VO sees the resume, the photograph and also con-
ducts a telephone conversation of up to 5 minutes in length.
FTF: (face-to-face) Employer FTF sees the resume, the photograph and also con-
ducts a face-to-face free form interview with the worker of up to 5 minutes
in length9.
The task of each employer i is to estimate the expected productivity wij of each
worker j in the 15 minute employment period. Employers are provided with the
same incentives as workers to truthfully reveal their estimates. Employer i faces
a penalty of 40 points for each mispredicted maze of worker j. For example, if
employer i decides that worker j can do 8 mazes but the worker solves 10 then the
employer receives a penalty of 80 points. Therefore, the total compensation  i of
employer i including the misprediction penalty is:
 i = 4000  
5  
j=1
40  |wij   Aj| (9)
Each employer decides on her estimates simultaneously after she has reviewed all
ﬁve workers. We refer to employer estimates as ‘wages’ with the caveat that the
employer does not pay those wages herself: she is only provided with incentives to
assign wages equal to the median productivity of each worker.10
Each worker j receives ﬁve actual wages Wij from the experimenter: one wage
for each employer i which is calculated as follows: with probability .8, employer i’s
estimate is used to pay the worker Wij = 100wij; with probability .2, the average
estimate w of all employers across all workers in the session is used to set the
worker’s wage to Wij = 100w (all draws are i.i.d. across workers and employers).
Before the employer decides on her 5 estimates but after she has seen all the
workers, she is told which of her estimates will contribute to the worker’s earnings.
The exact timing of this randomization is important for our design because it allows
9Note that we distinguish between treatment VO (visual and oral interaction) and true face-to-
face communication. Numerous studies have shown that non-verbal cues are powerful predictors
of interpersonal evaluations (see Straus, Miles, and Levesque (2001) for an overview). Non-verbal
signals help to form initial evaluations and cues such as eye contact amplify these ﬁrst impressions
(Hemsley and Doob, 1978).
10Our incentives are designed to simulate the incentives of a real-world perfectly competitive
labor market where each employer sets wages equal to the expected productivity of each worker.
7us to test for some types of direct taste-based discrimination: an employer with
a taste for physical attractiveness might want to sacriﬁce earnings by reporting a
higher estimate and incurring a larger penalty as a result. However, she has no
incentive to do so if she knows that her estimate will not be used to compensate
the worker. It is also crucial that an employer does not know the outcome of this
randomization during the interview because she could inform the worker and hence
destroy his incentives to convince the employer of his ability. It would be akin to
a job interview where the worker knows in advance that he will not get the job.
After all worker-employer interactions are completed workers are taken to the
computer lab for their 15 minute employment period. The total earnings  j of a
worker j consist of his piece rate earnings minus his misprediction penalty plus all
5 wages:
 j = 100   Aj   40  |Cj   Aj| +
5  
i=1
Wij (10)
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We use the experimental data to estimate treatment-by-treatment variants of the
following empirical model which is based on our theoretical framework:
wij =  Xj +  PPj       
Resume
variables
+  Bj +  Cj       
stereotype and
conﬁdence chan-
nels
+ Sij +  BSij   Bj +  CSij   Cj       
taste-based discrimi-
nation
+ Aj +  i +  ij(11)
Worker j has characteristics (Xj,P j,B j,C j) where Xj is a vector of all observ-
able job market characteristics and Pj is his projected performance based on his
practice time. All employers have access to the resume variables (Xj,P j). The
coe cient   and   capture the visual/oral stereotype channels and conﬁdence
channel respectively. We deﬁne a new indicator variable Sij which is equal to 1 if
the employer’s estimate wij determines the worker’s wage (Wij = 100   wij). The
coe cients  O and  V are positive if there is taste-based discrimination in favor
of the physically-attractive or the conﬁdent. The coe cient   indicates whether
employers have information that improves their productivity estimate but which is
not yet captured by worker characteristics (Xj,P j,B j,C j). We add an error term
to the speciﬁcation to be able to run regressions - this error includes an employer
ﬁxed e ect  i and all our wage regressions are employer ﬁxed e ects regressions.
Here we are exploiting the fact that each employer sets the wages of 5 di erent
8workers.
We ﬁrst estimate the above speciﬁcation treatment-by-treatment and later also
a pooled regression to separate out our three transmission channels. Treatment
B provides a consistency check because we expect both   and   to be zero in the
absence of any visual and oral interaction. Treatments V and O allow us to identify
the three transmission channels. In treatment VO we can check to what extent
the two stereotype e ects are additive and in treatment FTF we test whether this
richer interaction mode ampliﬁes the transmission channels in any way.
In all regressions we include both exogenous characteristics such as age and sex
and decision variables on workers’ resumes such as participation in team sports,
choice of university major, hobbies and previous job experience (number of previous
jobs and characteristics of last job held). Neal and Johnson (1996) and Heckman
(1998) advise against the inclusion of decision variables when estimating labor
market discrimination e ects because some of the e ects of physical attractiveness
might be transmitted through these decision variables. However, we can only vary
the degree of visual and oral interaction between worker and employer during the
wage negotiation process in our experiment but not past decision variables. We
therefore follow Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) and only attempt to decompose the
marginal e ect of looks after accounting for all the other sources of variations in
earnings that are usually measured in labor economics.11
4 Data Description
4.1 Subject Pool
We conducted 33 experimental sessions at Universidad Nacional de Tucuman, Tu-
cuman, Argentina from August 2002 to March 2003. Participants were recruited at
three di erent university campuses in the city of Tucuman - Universidad Nacional
de Tucuman (UNIVERSITY1), Universidad del Norte Santo Tomas de Aquino
(UNIVERSITY2), Universidad Tecnologica Nacional (UNIVERSITY3) with ap-
proximately 87% of participants coming from the UNIVERSITY1 campus. Spe-
cial precautions were taken to make sure that participants did not know each other
prior to the experiment or could see or communicate with each other upon arrival
to the lab. Each participant received a participation fee of 12 Peso plus his earnings
from the experiment in cash at the end of the experiment. The average hourly wage
at the time in Tucuman was about 6 Peso. For calculating the earnings we used
11It is worth noting that we do not ﬁnd substantial di erences between the two speciﬁcations.
9an exchange rate of 100 points   = 0.25 Peso. The game lasted from one to one and
a half hours and the average earnings were 14.34 Peso in addition to the participa-
tion fee. The entire game including instructions and exit questions was played on
the computer using a web-based Spanish interface. The instructions were also read
aloud and included practice questions with answers to check whether participants
had understood the instructions.12
Our participants were drawn from a variety of majors (33% from arts and
humanities, 46% from sciences, medicine and computers, and 21% from business
and economics). Male participants accounted for 58% of our sample. About 50%
of our participants have internet access at home which is captured by the indicator
variable INTERNET and serves as a proxy for wealth. The resume variables Xj for
worker j which every employer could observe consisted of demographic variables
(age, sex, matriculation year, university, internet at home and participation in
team sports), job experience controls (number of previous jobs and description of
last job), university major and hobbies (up to three). Basic summary statistics
can be found in table 1.13
4.2 Measurement of Beauty
We follow Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) and have frontal facial photographs of all
330 participants evaluated on a scale from 1 to 5 (plain to above average beautiful).
Our evaluators were 50 high school students from Tucuman. They were presented
with the same facial photographs (in random order) that were previously shown
to employers in the three treatments V, VO and FTF. The average inter-rater
correlation coe cient of 0.349 is comparable to Biddle and Hamermesh (1998).
We construct the variable BEAUTY as the mean over all raters’ centered beauty
ratings. We obtain rater i’s centered beauty rating ˜ rij of subject j by subtracting
the rater’s average beauty rating ˆ ri from each raw rating rij. This e ectively strips
out measurement error arising from di erent perceptions of ‘average’ beauty.14 We
then normalize the beauty measure by dividing by the standard error. This allows
us to interpret regression coe cients on BEAUTY as the e ect of a one-standard
deviation increase in physical attractiveness. Worker and employer physical at-
12The practice questions asked participants to calculate earnings in various scenarios.
13The footnote in the table also explains how we coded description of last job held, university
major, and hobbies. Additional detailed information is available upon request.
14Our results all go through if we use the raw beauty measure: however, the estimated coe -
cients are slightly smaller and the standard errors slightly bigger as one would expect from using
a more noisy measure of physical attractiveness.
10tractiveness measures are found in table 2.
4.3 Performance Variables
Our measure of productivity is the the total number of mazes solved during the
employment period and workers’ estimates after the practice round provide our
conﬁdence measure.15 Table 2 shows the practice and actual performance as well
as the conﬁdence of workers. We run our regressions with log ability LNAC-
TUAL and log conﬁdence LNESTIMATED which allows us to interpret estimated
coe cients as elasticities. We also use a projected productivity measure LNPRO-
JECTED which extrapolates from the performance time in the practice maze:
LNPROJECTED = ln((15   60)/PRACTICE).16
Table 2 also describes the wages (WAGE) and log-wages (LNWAGE) set by
employers. Since every employer evaluates 5 workers and there are 165 employers
altogether we have 825 data points. SETWAGE is a dummy variable which is set
to 1 if the employer’s productivity estimate is used to pay the worker and is 0 if
the worker receives an average wage.17
5 Preliminary Results
We ﬁrst verify that physical attractiveness does not raise actual productivity.
However, beauty does raise both the worker’s and the employer’s productivity
estimates.
5.1 Determinants of Maze-Solving Productivity
We regress measured log-productivity Aj on all resume variables Xj and physical
attractiveness:
Aj =  Xj +  Bj +  j (12)
15Social psychologists use ‘self-e cacy’ scales to assess optimistic self-beliefs to cope with di -
cult demands in life (Cassidy and Long, 1996; Lorr and Wunderlich, 1986; Mittag and Schwarzer,
1993). An advantage of our conﬁdence measure is that it is task-speciﬁc and has a natural and
easily interpretable metric.
16Although practice time exceeds the average maze solving time during the employment period
the mean value of LNPROJECTED is larger than LNACTUAL. This is a consequence of Jensen’s
inequality - practice time is a much noisier estimate of ability than total 15 minute productivity.
17It is striking how strongly subjects seem to underestimate learning: the average level 1
practice maze takes 127 seconds to solve while the average level 2 maze is solved in only 94
seconds during the employment period. However, both employers and workers’ productivity
estimates are too low by 20 and 24 percent, respectively.
11The results are shown in column (1) of table 3. Note that the coe cient on beauty
is not signiﬁcant. We also observe a large gender gap in maze solving productivity
in our sample: men solved 10.9 mazes on average during the 15 minute employment
period; women only solved 7.8 mazes. Controlling for worker resume does not
reduce this gender gap of about 30 percent.18
When we also control for practice performance in column (2) of table 3 we see
that projected performance is strongly signiﬁcant but that the magnitude is small:
a one percent increase in projected performance increases actual productivity only
by 0.16 percent.
5.2 Determinants of Worker Conﬁdence
We next look at the determinants of worker conﬁdence by ﬁrst regressing conﬁdence
on resume variables Xj and beauty Bj shown in column (3) of table 3. In column
(4) we add controls for performance in the practice maze Pj and actual ability Aj:
Cj =  Xj + µPj +  Aj +  Bj +  j (13)
This allows us to test whether workers have private information about their true
ability.
Physically attractive workers are substantially more conﬁdent: a one standard
deviation increase in BEAUTY raises conﬁdence by between 13 and 16 percent.
Moreover, workers have private information about their true ability even though
they rely more heavily on projected performance: a one percent increase in ability
LNACTUAL increases conﬁdence only by .18 percent while a one percent increase
in the projected performance LNPROJECTED raises conﬁdence by .43 percent.
Unlike in the ability regression there are no gender e ects in the conﬁdence
regression. Even though men in our sample are better than women at solving
mazes they are not more conﬁdent once we control for their true ability. We
also add an interaction term between MALE and BEAUTY in column (5) to test
for gender speciﬁc e ects of beauty on conﬁdence. This term is not statistically
signiﬁcant either.
18Compared to Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) our gender gap is smaller than their
gender gap in the mixed tournament treatment (15 versus 10.8) but larger than the corresponding
gap of 1.5 in their piece rate treatment (11.23 versus 9.73).
125.3 Determinants of Employer’s Expectations
For each of our ﬁve treatments we estimate a simpliﬁed version of our empirical
model from equation 11:
wij =  Xj +  PPj +  Bj +  Sij +  Sij   Bj +  Aj +  i +  ij (14)
The coe cient   measures the gross beauty premium and   captures the presence
of taste-based discrimination. We use ﬁxed e ects estimation in order to control
for employer ﬁxed e ects  i.
The left side of table 4 shows our estimation results. There is no beauty pre-
mium in treatment B in which employers only access resumes without any visual
or oral stimuli. In contrast, there are signiﬁcant beauty premia in all other treat-
ments (V, O, VO and FTF), ranging from 12-13 percent increase in wages for a one
standard deviation increase in beauty in treatment V, O, and VO to a 17 percent
increase in treatment FTF. These premia are of a similar order of magnitude as
the beauty premia found by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) in their cross-sectional
analysis of North American wage data.
The fact that we do not observe a beauty premium in treatment B suggests
that we are indeed identifying returns to looks and not just the e ect of some
correlated omitted variable. It is especially striking that there is a beauty premium
in treatment O where workers can only interact orally but not visually with the
employer. This provides some preliminary evidence for the oral stereotype e ect
and the conﬁdence channel. The e ects of beauty seem to be particularly strong in
the face-to-face interaction - however, this di erence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The coe cient on LNACTUAL is not statistically signiﬁcant in all treatments
except FTF where it is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. This indi-
cates that our worker characteristics adequately capture the available information
to employers. We do not ﬁnd evidence of direct taste-based discrimination: the
coe cient   on SETWAGE*BEAUTY is not signiﬁcant in any of the ﬁve regres-
sions except for treatment V where it has a negative sign. This does not imply
that discrimination based on employers’ tastes is necessarily unimportant in real
world labor markets: if employers derive utility from interacting with an attractive
employee over an extended period of time our experimental design cannot account
for this e ect.
136 Decomposing the Beauty Premium
We next decompose the beauty premium which we found in our wage regressions.
6.1 Decomposition by Treatment
We start by adding controls for worker conﬁdence to our wage regressions from the
previous section. We now estimate the full empirical model from equation 11:
wij =  Xj+ PPj+ Bj+ Cj+ Sij+ VSij Bj+ OSij Bj+ Aj+ i+ ij (15)
Results are on the right hand side of table 4.
The residual beauty premium is measured by the coe cient on BEAUTY and
the conﬁdence channel by the coe cient on LNESTIMATED. First of all, we note
that there is a signiﬁcant return to conﬁdence in treatments O, VO and FTF where
workers can interact orally with employers. We do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
conﬁdence premia in treatments B and V which we would expect since there is no
oral communication between worker and employer in these treatments. However,
we cannot reject equality of the conﬁdence premia across treatments. A one percent
increase in conﬁdence increases wages by about 0.2 percent in treatments O and VO
and .3 percent in treatment FTF. Notably, the conﬁdence premium in treatment
VO is not signiﬁcantly larger than in treatment O (if anything it is smaller). This
suggests that the employer is unaware that beauty boosts conﬁdence - otherwise
she would be able to correct for beauty in the VO treatment and apply a larger
weight on conﬁdence.
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) include measures of self-esteem in their wage
cross-sectional regressions and ﬁnd that these measures are signiﬁcant just as the
conﬁdence variable is in our analysis. However, there is little e ect on the size of
the beauty premium in their estimation and unlike us they observe only a weak
correlation between beauty and self-esteem. This might be the result of greater
measurement error of conﬁdence. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) have to rely on a
psychometric measure of general self-esteem in their survey data whereas we can
extract a cardinal measure of conﬁdence in solving the speciﬁc experimental task
with a natural scale. Furthermore, our experimental setup allows us to interpret the
coe cient on conﬁdence as a causal e ect rather than a correlation coe cient: we
do not have to worry about reverse causality such that more highly paid subjects
enjoy greater self-esteem. Finally, the fact that conﬁdence only matters in the
treatments with oral interaction indicates that our conﬁdence measure is not just
14a proxy for omitted variables.
The beauty premia in treatments O, VO and FTF decline when we control for
conﬁdence but are still signiﬁcantly di erent from 0. This decline suggests that
at least part of the beauty premium is transmitted through greater conﬁdence of
physically-attractive workers. We can decompose it in treatments O, VO and FTF
by using the following back of the envelope calculation. One standard deviation
in beauty increases conﬁdence by about 13 percent according to our regression
results in table 3 (we assume SETWAGE is zero for simplicity). In treatment O
a one percent increase in conﬁdence increases wages by 0.20 percent. Therefore,
the total increase in wages of a one standard deviation increase in beauty which
is transmitted through the conﬁdence channel is 13   0.20 percent = 2.6 percent.
The residual beauty premium after controlling for conﬁdence in treatment O is 8.7
percent for a one standard deviation increase in beauty. The sum of both e ects is
11.3 percent which is reasonably close to the gross beauty premium of 12.8 percent
that we estimated for treatment O. For completeness, table 5 presents the same
decomposition for treatments VO and FTF.
We attribute the estimated residual beauty premia to the visual and oral stereo-
type channels that make the beautiful appear more able in the eyes of the employer.
The visual stereotype e ect (treatment V) raises wages by about 10.5 percent for
each one standard deviation increase in beauty when employers only see a picture
of the worker. Interestingly, there still remains a strong residual beauty premium
in treatment O where employers have no visual information about the worker but
only interact verbally over the phone. This suggests that beauty is correlated with
certain oral communication skills other than conﬁdence that raise employers’ esti-
mates. The visual and oral stereotype e ects do not seem additive: in treatments
VO and FTF where employers and workers interact both visually and orally the
beauty premia are only marginally greater but not signiﬁcantly so.
6.2 Decomposition across Treatments
We ﬁnally estimate the full empirical model across all ﬁve treatments
wij =  Xj +  PPj +
 
t
 P,tTt   Pj +  0Bj +  0Cj +
 
t
 tTt   Bj +
 
t
 tTt   Cj +
+  Sij +  VTV   Sij   Bj +  OTO   Sij   Cj +  Aj +  i +  ij (16)
where t = V,O,V O,FTF. The speciﬁcation is the same as in equation 11 except
that we add the indicator variables TVO for combined visual and oral interactions
15(treatments VO and FTF) and TFTF for face-to-face communication. By inter-
acting these two additional variables with beauty and conﬁdence we can check
whether the visual and oral stereotype channels are additive and whether there
is an additional e ect from face-to-face communication. Moreover, we allow the
coe cients on the practice performance to vary across the ﬁve treatments. The
regression results are in table 6.19
The coe cients on BEAUTY*VISUAL and BEAUTY*AUDIO capture the vi-
sual and oral stereotype channels: a one standard deviation increase in beauty
provides a 9.4 percent and 10.3 percent wage gain respectively. The conﬁdence
channel raises the wage by about 0.27 percent for each one percent increase in
conﬁdence. This translates into a 3.6 percent increase in wages for a one standard
deviation increase in beauty. Since the average number of mazes estimated by
participants is 7, a subject who believes he could do one more maze than average
would register a 14% increase in conﬁdence, which in turn translates into a 4%
increase in wage. Face-to-face interaction does not amplify the stereotype and
conﬁdence channels signiﬁcantly.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that about 15-20 percent of the beauty premium is
transmitted through the conﬁdence channel and about 40 percent each through
the visual and oral interaction channels. However, this decomposition comes with
the caveat that the visual and oral stereotype channels are not fully additive: the
coe cient on BEAUTY*VISUAL*AUDIO is negative and weakly signiﬁcant.
7 Conclusion
We decompose the beauty premium in an experimental labor market and identify
three transmission channels: the visual and oral stereotype channel and the con-
ﬁdence channel. Our results are complementary to the existing labor literature
starting with Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) who identiﬁed the beauty premium
in real data.
As with a vast body of experimental studies, standard criticisms of our stu-
dent subject pool apply. The experience of real-world human resource o cers
might make them less susceptible to physical features of the applicants. Another
important caveat is that we only model the interview process. If employer and
19This additive decomposition is appropriate only for the case when the employer is unaware of
the conﬁdence-boosting e ects of beauty. If she could ﬁlter out this e ect under visual interaction
we would have expected to estimate a larger coe cient   on worker conﬁdence in treatment VO
versus treatment O in the previous section which was not the case.
16worker interact repeatedly over the long-term direct taste-based discrimination
might again become a more important contributor to the beauty premium and
stereotype and conﬁdence e ects might become less relevant. However, we ﬁnd it
encouraging that our experiment generates a sizable beauty premium of the right
order of magnitude which gives us some conﬁdence that our decomposition applies
more generally.
If one is willing to extrapolate from our experiment to the labor market more
generally we can draw two main policy implications. First, ‘blind’ interview pro-
cedures such as telephone interviews can reduce the beauty premium.20 Second
and perhaps more surprisingly, our results suggest that the beauty premium would
decline even more strongly by preventing oral interaction between employer and
employee. However, such a policy would likely decrease the quality of job matches
along other dimensions because employers learn valuable private information dur-
ing the interview stage.
While we focus on decomposition of the beauty premium in this paper, our
methodology can be fruitfully adopted to study the causes of discriminatory pay
di erentials in other settings.
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19Table 1: Summary statistics - characteristics of workers and employers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
MAJOR SCIENCE 0.134 0.342
Workers - Demographic Variables MAJOR COMPUTERS 0.22 0.415
MAJOR HUMANITIES 0.244 0.431
AGE 22.963 3.212 MAJOR MEDICINE 0.104 0.306
MALE 0.564 0.497 MAJOR ARTS 0.091 0.289
MATRIC 1998.317 2.784
UNIVERSITY1 0.848 0.36 Workers - Hobbies
UNIVERSITY2 0.091 0.288
UNIVERSITY3 0.061 0.239 HOBBY COMPUTERS 0.273 0.46
INTERNET 0.515 0.501 HOBBY RECREATION 0.855 0.791
TEAMSPORT 0.612 0.489 HOBBY ARTS 0.830 0.746
HOBBY SPORT 0.655 0.738
Workers - Job Experience
Employers - Demographic Variables
INTERVIEWS 1.267 1.303
PREVJOBS 1.188 1.337 EMP AGE 22.673 2.482
JOB EDUCATION 0.067 0.25 EMP MALE 0.604 0.491
JOB COMPUTERS 0.024 0.154 EMP MATRIC 1998.659 2.364
JOB RETAIL 0.091 0.288 EMP UNIVERSITY1 0.902 0.298
JOB BUSINESS 0.067 0.25 EMP UNIVERSITY2 0.061 0.24
JOB GOVERNMENT 0.036 0.188 EMP UNIVERSITY3 0.037 0.188
JOB ARTS 0.036 0.188 EMP INTERNET 0.482 0.501
JOB FOOD 0.006 0.078 EMP TEAMSPORT 0.604 0.491
JOB INDUSTRY 0.006 0.078
INTERACTION DEGREE 0.636 1.357
Workers - College Major
MAJOR BUSINESS 0.207 0.407
N = 165
Employer variables start with the preﬁx EMP. MATRIC is the undergraduate matriculation year. UNIVER-
SITY1, UNIVERSITY2, and UNIVERSITY3 are indicator variables for the three universities at which subjects
are studying. INTERNET is an indicator variable for having an internet connection at home and TEAMSPORT
captures whether a subject participates in team sports. Intended or actual majors are summarized by variables
MAJOR BUSINESS, MAJOR SCIENCE, MAJOR COMPUTERS, MAJOR HUMANITIES, MAJOR MEDICINE,
MAJOR ARTS indicating whether a subject concentrates on business, science, information technology, humanities,
medicine, or arts. The number of previous jobs held by a subject are captured by PREVJOBS and the number of job
interviews by INTERVIEWS. The nature of previous employment for those with work experience is denoted by vari-
ables JOB EDUCATION, JOB COMPUTERS, JOB RETAIL, JOB BUSINESS, JOB GOVERNMENT, JOB ARTS,
JOB FOOD, JOB INDUSTRY indicating employment in education, information technology, retail sales, business, pub-
lic sector, arts, food production and service, and industry. INTERACTION DEGREE is a variable that describes the
intensity of interpersonal interactions required in each job on a scale from 0 to 5, 0 implying no interactions and 5
being the most intense as for a secretary or a waiter. Hobbies were coded using HOBBY COMPUTERS for computers,
HOBBY RECREATION for recreation (e.g. watching TV or listening to music), HOBBY ARTS for creative tasks
(e.g., writing, drawing, or composing music), HOBBY SPORT for sports. If a subject reported several hobbies that
were of the same category, the number of hobbies were added up and a total score reported. No hobbies in a certain
category resulted in an entry of 0.Table 2: Summary statistics - physical attractiveness, maze solving performance
and wages
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Physical Attractiveness Conﬁdence
BEAUTY 0.024 1 ESTIMATED 7.255 4.013
EMP BEAUTY 0.026 1 LNESTIMATED 1.829 0.573
Maze Performance Wages
PRACTICE 126.691 92.292 WAGE 7.727 5.13
ACTUAL 9.527 3.874 LNWAGE 1.863 0.612
LNPROJECTED 2.225 0.764 SETWAGE 0.531 0.499
LNACTUAL 2.149 0.504
N = 165 for all variables except WAGE, SETWAGE, LNWAGE (N = 825)
BEAUTY and EMP BEAUTY denote the physical attractiveness of worker/employer respectively. Both
measures are detrended and the standard deviation is normalized to 1. The raw performance measures are
PRACTICE for the time (measured in seconds) to solve the practice maze and ACTUAL for the number
of mazes solved during the 15 minute employment period. LNPROJECTED is the log of the predicted
number of mazes solved during the employment period based on the practice performance. LNACTUAL
is the log of actual performance. The conﬁdence measures are ESTIMATED (estimated performance)
and LNESTIMATED, the log of estimated performance. WAGE denotes the employer estimate of the
performance of a worker and LNWAGE is the log of this estimate. SETWAGE is set to 1 if the employer
estimate is contributing to the compensation of the worker.Table 3: The impact of practice performance and beauty on maze solving ability
and conﬁdence
LNACTUAL LNESTIMATED
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AGE 0.081 0.038 0.181  0.018 0.018
(0.065) (0.064) (0.074) (0.060) (0.060)
AGE*AGE -0.002† -0.001 -0.003  0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MALE 0.331   0.303   0.221  0.015 0.015
(0.086) (0.081) (0.097) (0.080) (0.081)
UNIVERSITY2 -0.113 -0.088 -0.026 0.035 0.036
(0.143) (0.139) (0.163) (0.127) (0.128)
UNIVERSITY3 0.042 0.115 -0.358 -0.183 -0.184
(0.201) (0.197) (0.229) (0.179) (0.180)
INTERNET 0.158† 0.136† 0.089 0.042 0.042
(0.083) (0.080) (0.094) (0.074) (0.075)
TEAMSPORT 0.062 0.054 0.133 0.127 0.128
(0.088) (0.085) (0.101) (0.078) (0.079)
PREVJOBS 0.057 0.052 0.012 -0.003 -0.003
(0.037) (0.036) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033)
LNACTUAL 0.177  0.177 
(0.078) (0.079)
LNPROJECTED 0.160   0.429   0.429  
(0.054) (0.051) (0.051)
BEAUTY -0.034 0.162   0.135   0.133  
(0.042) (0.048) (0.038) (0.051)
BEAUTY*MALE 0.002
(0.075)
N 163 163 163 163 163
R2 0.323 0.362 0.304 0.587 0.587
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10%   : 5%    : 1%
The dependent variable is LNACTUAL in columns (1) and (2) and LNESTIMATED in columns
(3), (4) and (5); standard errors are shown in paranthesis. The base university is UNIVER-
SITY1. All regressions include the following additional resume controls: choice of college major,
hobby variables and previous job market experience.T
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.Table 5: Contribution of conﬁdence channel to gross beauty premium in treatments
O, VO and FTF
Treatment Beauty Premium Conﬁdence Channel Gross Beauty
(controlled for conﬁdence) Premium
O 8.7 2.6 12.8
VO 9.8 2.4 12.3
FTF 12.1 4.3 16.7
The entries are wage increases in percentage points for each one standard deviation increase in
beauty. They are calculated using the estimated coe cients in tables 3 and 4. SETWAGE is
assumed to be zero.Table 6: Estimation of full empirical model
Variable (1)
LNPROJECTED 0.409  
(0.043)
LNPROJECTED*VISUAL 0.007
(0.059)
LNPROJECTED*AUDIO -0.129 
(0.059)
LNPROJECTED*VISUAL*AUDIO 0.056
(0.084)
LNPROJECTED*FTF -0.069
(0.060)
LNACTUAL -0.004
(0.027)
BEAUTY -0.010
(0.031)
BEAUTY*VISUAL 0.094 
(0.043)
BEAUTY*AUDIO 0.103  
(0.035)
BEAUTY*VISUAL*AUDIO -0.097†
(0.050)
BEAUTY*FTF 0.052
(0.035)
LNESTIMATED 0.018
(0.065)
LNESTIMATED*VISUAL 0.034
(0.083)
LNESTIMATED*AUDIO 0.265  
(0.083)
LNESTIMATED*VISUAL*AUDIO -0.056
(0.117)
LNESTIMATED*FTF -0.116
(0.083)
N 812
R2 0.627
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10%   : 5%    : 1%
The dependent variable is LNWAGE; standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The base university is
UNIVERSITY1. The regression includes the following resume controls: demographic variables (sex, age
and age squared, internet at home, participation in team sports, choice of college major, hobby variables
and previous job market experience. The regression also includes SETWAGE, and SETWAGE interacted
with BEAUTY and LNESTIMATED.
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